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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the factors affecting bilateral Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
stocks from 14 high income countries to 31 OECD countries over the period 1995-2015. We 
specifically emphasise the effect of regional trade agreements such as the European Union (EU) 
and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) along with membership of the Currency 
Union. Our empirical analysis applies the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator to 
a gravity model of bilateral FDI stocks. The findings imply that EU membership is a significant 
determinant of FDI even when we condition on the variables that follow from the application 
of the gravity model. We look at the effects of the North American Free Trade Area on within 
block FDI and find no similar effect. Our results suggest that European Integration has a large 
effect on FDI stocks, raising intra Single Market FDI noticeably. We note that the UK’s 
departure from the Single Market may reduce the stock of intra EU FDI by up to 30 per cent in 
the long run. In addition, the findings point that the UK has no labour market or competitive 
environment advantage above the rest of the EU in attracting FDI. 
Keywords: Regional trade agreements; Multinational firms; Foreign direct investment; 
generalised method of moments; gravity equation; dynamic panel data model. 
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1. Introduction  
Global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows have been large in the last two decades, 
and there is general agreement about the push and pull factors that influence them, and they are 
summarised in the Gravity model (see Head and Mayer 2014 for an excellent survey mainly 
focussed on trade). We know that economic integration may raise the connectedness of 
production and increase FDI in a market such as the European Union (EU). In addition, 
directing investment into overseas markets can be used to avoid direct and indirect barriers to 
trade such as regulatory standards, tariffs and other barriers associated with trade and 
competition policy as well as with those associated by the evolution of the trading blocks that 
are the focus of interest in this paper.  In this paper we distinguish between the ‘creating’ and 
‘diverting’ forces on FDI emanating from trade block arrangements. 
 
Economic integration between countries has many forms, and they can integrate parts of 
their economies together through an economic union such as EU or through a free trade 
agreement such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Economic integration is 
often thought to attract FDI from countries outside of the economic integration area. However, 
the effect on FDI from countries within the economic integration zone is ambiguous. The 
removal of trade barriers may well reduce foreign investment from countries within an 
economic integration area and is substituted by an increase in international trade. On the other 
hand, foreign investment could be increased within the area due to a lower cost of factor 
relocation or because barriers to operation have been reduced by the integration process. There 
are many studies on the impact of the two economic integration programmes we discuss on 
bilateral trade. How this integration affects FDI seems under-researched.  
 
This article investigates bilateral FDI from the 14 largest high income OECD countries 
to all the high income countries in the OECD using annual stock data over the period 1995-
2015. This is the country group where data quality is high, and concepts are sufficiently similar 
across countries that empirical work has a chance of uncovering underlying structures. Our time 
period is influenced by availability of data for some of our variables, such as the indicators of 
market freedom1, and covers the period of intense Globalisation and European Integration that 
began after the WTO was set up and the Single Market Programme (SMP) in Europe completed. 
We use a Gravity model to determine the key factors that drive FDI and we take into account 
other economic and institutional factors, such as membership of trade arrangements that may 
affect the distribution of FDI stocks across the host countries. We estimate a dynamic panel 
using systems-GMM as it not only exploits the time series variation in the data, but accounts 
for unobserved country specific effects while controlling for possible correlation between the 
regressors and the error term. We focus on Europe, and show that the SMP has raised intra-EU 
FDI by around 40 per cent, reflecting greater integration in the last 25 years. The formation of 
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) has not had a similar impact. Even within the 
OECD institutions and their quality matters, and we show that common languages and distance 
between countries affect FDI significantly. 
 
The two areas we cover, NAFTA and the EU have had different approaches to integration, 
with NAFTA being focussed on trade integration and the facilitation of the movement of goods. 
It seems to have had little impact on FDI within the region, with the standard factors of size, 
distance and institutions appearing to provide a fully adequate description of the evolution of 
the stocks of FDI within NAFTA over our period. The EU has approached integration in a 
different way, with an international programme to reduce the barriers to competition within the 
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market area. Integration has been much more extensive with significant coordination of 
regulations and standards. This programme has removed barriers to the movement of FDI 
within the region, and FDI stocks have risen significantly more than the standard factors of size, 
distance and institutions would suggest.  
The article first looks at the literature on Gravity models of FDI with the data and 
methodology subsequently being discussed, followed by estimation results and robustness tests. 
Finally, conclusions are offered.  
2. Multinational Corporations and a Gravity Model of FDI 
2.1 Gravity Models and FDI 
In this paper we study stocks of FDI as these reflect the level of involvement of foreign 
firms in the domestic economy, whilst flows only denote changes in involvement. Many other 
papers also use  outward stocks of FDI (Egger and Merlo, 2007, Baltagi et al., 2007, Stein and 
Daude, 2007, Cardamone and Scoppola, 2015) for these reasons. Additionally, flows can be 
negative whilst trade flows cannot, and the gravity model we use here is almost always 
estimated in logs, as is discussed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Negative FDI flows will be 
common, and not just when a company, such as a bank, sells assets in a host and repatriates the 
funds, or when a large German multinational, such as Daimler, sells a US multinational it owns, 
Chrysler, to an Italian Multinational, Fiat2. However, such transactions have noticeable, but not 
excessive effects on stocks of FDI.  
 
The framework for the analysis of multinationals developed in Antras and Yeaple (2014) 
demonstrates a strong case for taking in to account the relative size of countries as well as the 
frictions associated with moving between them. These features lead naturally to sort of 
framework discussed in the Head and Mayer (2014) paper on Gravity Models. The Gravity 
model was first adopted to analyse international trade flows and then subsequently applied to 
other applications such as bilateral FDI. Its advantages are the simplicity of structure and its 
compatibility with a wide range of theoretical frameworks (Head and Mayer, 2014). 
Microeconomic foundations were developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008) amongst others. The model’s flexibility allows for both “push” factors 
originating in home countries and “pull” factors arising from host economies. It has been widely 
employed to study FDI as can be seen from the applications, among others, in  Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) and Bevan and Estrin (2004). These papers provide evidence that bilateral FDI 
between any two economies is positively related to size and negatively to distance.  
The Gravity variables adopted in this study are measures of market size, proximity and 
distance. Market size of home and host countries is commonly measured by real GDP in trade 
studies, and has been used in nearly all empirical studies of FDI. We do not impose common 
coefficients on home and host GDP, although this is common, as we wish to evaluate whether 
market oriented factors are more important than home size. Following the work at CEPII, 
transportation and information costs are normally measured by a bilateral variable that 
computes the metric distance between the economic central point of home and host countries3. 
                                                          
2 Repositioning of headquarters, as when Shell or Unilever move their domicile from the UK to the Netherlands (or back again) 
for tax purposes can lead to large FDI flows, and aggregate bilateral flows can be negative in these cases, and hence cannot be 
logged, but periods where this occurs should not be omitted. 
3 See Mayer and Zignano (2011) for details of the widely used measure of distance developed at CEPII. It generally reduces 
the impact of distance as compared to a capital city to capital city measure common in Gravity studies until around 2010. 
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Information costs may also arise in response to institutional and cultural distance. This  may be 
based on language similarities between the home and host countries in the sample, or on other 
historical factors such as colonial ties. Trade patterns have had a significant effect on the size 
of FDI. Trade is commonly measured by a bilateral export variable, and this is intended to 
capture whether trade complements FDI activity. Trade relations are also affected by trade 
blocks and by common markets, and we emphasise them, but these are not commonly included 
in studies of FDI, especially those studies based on individual country firm level data.  
Our focus in this paper is mainly on the impact of the SMP and other trade blocks on 
stocks of FDI in high income markets in the OECD. Early studies, such as that by Barrell and 
Pain (1997) demonstrated that the Single Market was having an impact on FDI from outside 
the Union as well as within it, and all recent research supports the conclusion that the SMP has 
stimulated FDI within the EU. This in part comes from the growth of complex supply chains 
within the Union, as is discussed by Cresenzi et al. (2014), as firms find that barriers have been 
removed and they can begin to utilise special skills and advantages in other countries within the 
Single Market.  In addition to such vertical FDI firms can undertake horizontal FDI across 
countries in the Single Market and utilise central specialist production and technology in 
multiple remote plants, much as we see in the US Single Market. 
The Single Market has changed the patterns of FDI stocks within Europe noticeably over 
the last two decades, with stocks of FDI in Europe growing more rapidly than in other advanced 
economies whilst becoming more European in origin. If we compare the start and the end of 
the decade from 2003 to 20124, we can see a clear increase in internal European stocks relative 
to home and host GDP, and a fall in the share of inward stocks originating from the US. The 
major external investor remained the US, with about 50 percent of outward FDI stocks from 
the US located in Europe, with around a third of that located in the UK at the start of the period, 
and about a quarter in of it in 2012. Over the decade the outward stock of US FDI rose from 24 
to 32 percent of its GDP. Over the same period the stock of inward FDI in the UK rose from 28 
percent of GDP to 48 percent, with much of the increase coming from the rest of Europe, with 
the European share of the inward stock rising from 47 to 58 percent, which the US share fell 
from 38 percent to 29 percent. The increasing Europeanisation or the stock of inward FDI 
reflects increasing integration in the region. This is also shown by trends in both the level and 
location of outward stocks of FDI from Germany where the European share rose from 65 to 69 
percent over the period, whilst that from France rose from 63 to 67 percent. In both cases the 
outward stock of FDI as a percent of GDP rose over the decade by 50 percent or more from 
around 30 percent of GDP in 2003, and hence the scale of foreign investment within Europe 
rose rapidly as complex supply chains were constructed within the Single Market. These 
changes reduced the role of distance by exploiting commonalities in the Market 
We can draw a distinction between NAFTA, which is primarily a free trade area with 
common trade regulations and the EU which is an attempt to create a Single Market with 
common standards of regulation and competition. The differences exist for political reasons as 
much as for simple economic ones. In Europe there are a number of relatively small countries, 
and it is easier for political and economic groups to take control of competition and trade policy 
and operate it for sectorial advantage. The US already has only one market, and one political 
structure to control interest groups in a similar sized economy to the EU. 
                                                          
4 This is the period covered by the OECD BM3 data, and hence it is comparable across years without splicing. It also avoids 
end point problems associated with the rise of the probability of the UK leaving the Single Market. Stocks of outward FDI 
relative to GDP from European countries probably reached their peak just before the financial crisis, and there was then some 
retrenchment. 
 4 
 
 
2.2 Trade Agreements, Integration and FDI   
There has been an upsurge of interest in the effects of the EU on FDI in the recent past 
because of the UK’s decision to leave the Union, and potentially the Single Market. Bruno et 
al. (2016) use a synthetic counterfactual analysis of a large number of countries over the period 
since 1970 to create a synthetic UK outside the EU, embodying all the characteristics of similar 
countries. They suggest this synthetic country would have noticeably less FDI than we actually 
see in the UK. They back this analysis up with econometric work on flows of FDI, taking in to 
account a number of the factors we use, undertaking their analysis with a two step estimator. 
There have been a number of previous studies of the impacts of integration on FDI, and Bruno 
et.al. (2016) also undertake a meta-analysis of them, and draw similar conclusions. Overall, 
they suggest that the SMP may have raised FDI flows within Europe by between 14 and 38 per 
cent. 
Free trade areas and common markets have been tools for encouraging regional 
integration for some time, and they have been widely used for political as well as economic 
reasons. Kreinin and Plummer (2008) used an augmented gravity model to examine the effect 
of regional economic integration on FDI flows in the cases of the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and 
MERCOSUR. Their findings indicate that regional integration has had a significant and positive 
effect on FDI, which is a combination of investment creation and diversion; and there is 
evidence that FDI acts as a substitute for trade in a significant number of cases, although in 
some cases, it complements trade.  
Much of the empirical work on the impacts of trade agreements has involved 
investigations of the impact of Europe Agreements on FDI within the EU and to other European 
economies. These Agreements were designed to liberalise trade between the EU countries and 
the Central and Eastern European countries that had applied for EU membership. Baltagi et al. 
(2008) study the effects of these Agreements on bilateral outbound FDI stocks within Europe 
and find strong evidence for their impact. Their findings point to increased FDI from Western 
European home countries to Eastern European host countries flowing from the Europe 
Agreements.  
 There have been a number of studies looking at the impacts of NAFTA on FDI. For 
instance, MacDermott (2007) investigated the impact of NAFTA on FDI using a fixed-effects 
gravity model. There was evidence in these studies that trade integration increased FDI over 
the period 1982–1997. Feils and Rahman (2011) examined the impact of NAFTA on FDI into 
the region and the individual member countries. They find that the NAFTA implementation had 
a generally positive effect on inward FDI into the entire region, with the benefits accruing only 
to Canada and the United States. We test for NAFTA effects on FDI patterns below. 
2.3 Financial and macroeconomic impacts on multinationals 
The determinants of FDI can be considered in terms of primary characteristics like factor-
price differences, market size, and trade costs (Eaton and Tamura, 1994). There is a 
considerable literature on the determinants of FDI that augments the more traditional models 
by further factors: exchange rate regimes, political and economic stability, factor proportions, 
openness, product-market regulation and labour market arrangements. Here the focus is on 
those variables that are driven by policy or relate to the broader economic environment, and it 
is common to look at the openness of the economy as a core indicator of policy stance. This can 
be measured in a number of ways, and we address these below.  
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Recent empirical research on the impact of exchange rate regimes on FDI has focused 
mostly on the effect of the Euro.  Schiavo (2007) analysed the effects of the Euro on FDI flows 
from 1980 to 2001, and argued that the elimination of volatility stemming from the Euro ‘gives 
a non-negative impulse to cross border investment’  both with the rest of the world and inside 
the Euro-zone. However, only a brief part of their sample covers the relevant period. The 
Gravity model has also been used in this context by De Sousa and Lochard (2011), and Brouwer 
et al. (2008), who found a positive, significant effect of the Euro on FDI. Once again their 
coverage of the existence of the Euro is limited, and we can extend the analysis to 2015 in this 
paper. 
Political and economic instability are expected to drive FDI since they create uncertainty. 
It is expected that FDI will be more likely to flow into host economies that are politically stable 
with good access to large regional markets. It can be expected that investment is encouraged by 
a predictable policy environment that enhances macroeconomic stability, guarantees the rule of 
law and the enforcement of contracts, supports competitiveness, minimises distortions, and 
spurs private sector development. Pourshahabi et al. (2011) analysed the relation between FDI, 
economic freedom and growth in OECD economies and it was indicated that market size, 
inflation, political stability and economic freedom positively affected FDI inflows, though in 
the latter case the effect was insignificant. Additional cultural and proximity factors such as 
language have also been shown to have an impact by Buch et al. (2003), amongst others. 
The question of whether labour costs affect the investment decision in relation to the 
OECD countries is the subject of some debate. Bevan et al. (2004), as has been common in the 
literature, found a negative effect for labour cost on FDI, whilst Javorcik and Spearman (2005) 
found a positive and statistically significant impact, which may suggest that when labour costs 
rose in response to aggregate wage increases, investment also rose to reduce labour input. These 
effects may be genuine, or may come from neglected simultaneity, or more probably, the 
difficulty of using whole economy aggregate productivity measures when FDI often imports 
new techniques and structures that raise productivity of workers as compared to those outside 
the firm. However, Devereux and Griffith (1998) found unit labour costs differentials to be a 
non-significant driver of the location choices of US multinationals in the EU. They explain this 
result by their data not being disaggregated enough to measure productivity, so not reflecting 
firm heterogeneity within each industry. Their results may also indicate that foreign firms do 
not rely on domestic productivity levels, but rather bring their own techniques and skills to 
augment those of the host workforce. 
3. Data and Methodology  
To undertake the analysis, a panel has been collected that considers stock data on bilateral 
FDI from 14 high income OECD countries to 31 OECD countries (see Appendix) with annual 
data spanning the period 1995 to 2015. The dependent variable is the outward bilateral FDI 
stock divided by a GDP deflator5, which is among the most used measures of FDI in the 
literature. These stocks are defined as outward FDI, where an investment from country i to 
country j (FDIi,j) is seen as an outflow from the perspective of country i. We measure  the size 
of home and host countries by real GDP in a common currency. We use a Gravity model as a 
framework to test hypotheses on the roles of EU membership, NAFTA and the Euro zone on 
bilateral FDI. As there is a good deal of inertia in investment stock data we estimate a dynamic 
                                                          
5 Egger (2001), Baltagi et al. (2007), Egger and Merlo (2007), and Egger (2008) all specify the model in natural logarithms, as 
we do here, and the data set used here includes a number of observations where the FDI stock is zero. Here the dependent 
variable is log(1+(FDI/PGDP) which in our case closely approximates log(FDI/PGDP) and deals with our limited number of zeros. 
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model (Egger, 2001).6 With fewer than 30 time series observations, the autoregressive 
coefficient is likely to be biased downwards (Nickell, 1981), implying that the model is best 
estimated using what has been termed a systems GMM method (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
We start by specifying a gravity equation used to estimate the determinants of bilateral 
FDI stocks along the lines followed by Stein and Daude (2007). A number of factors are used 
to capture aspects of common culture and stronger ties through language, as well as a number 
of other possible determinants of bilateral stock patterns:  
ݕ୧,୨,୲ = ܽ଴ + ߣݕ୧,୨,୲ିଵ + ܽଵlog൫ܧܺ ୧ܲ,୨,୲൯ + ܽଶ log൫ܩܦ ୧ܲ,୲൯ + ܽଷ log൫ܩܦ ୨ܲ,୲൯ +
ܽସ log൫ܦܫ ୧ܵ,୨,୲൯ + ܽହܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୧,୲ + ܽ଺ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୨,୲ + ܽ଻log (ܷܥܮ୨,୧,୲) + ଼ܽܮܽ݊݃୧,୨ + ܽଽܥ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ +
ܽଵ଴ܧ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ + ܽଵଵܰܣܨܶܣ୧,୨,୲ + ܽଵଶܶ݅݉ܦ݂݅ ୧݂,୨,୲                                                                (1)   
Where , ,i j ty  in logarithms is the stock measure of bilateral outflow from the home country 
(i) to the host country (j) in year t, with FDI in current dollars deflated using the home country’s 
GDP deflator, its lagged value is indicated by the subscript t-1, and λ is the adjustment 
coefficient in the dynamic form of the gravity model. GDPi,t is real GDP for the home country 
and GDPj,t real GDP for the host country, EXPi,j,t is bilateral exports from the home to host 
country. EcoFreei,t is the free economic index for the home country and EcoFreej,t for the host 
country. The ‘Free Economy Index’7 is a measure by which the quality of the economic 
environment is proxied. It takes values in the range 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level 
of economic freedom. DISi,j,t is the log of geographic distance. These distance costs are 
measured by the metric distance between the economic central point of home and host 
countries. , ,j i tULC is labour costs in the host country relative to the home country. These are the 
costs in common currency of the labour input that is needed to produce one unit of output in 
the host country as compared to the home. Unit labour costs are taken from the OECD and are 
derived as the natural logarithmic difference between labour cost in host country relative to 
home country. We also capture  to capture further proximity factors using: Langi,j which is 
defined as the use of a common official language, which reflects cultural similarities.   
We also use a number of variables that are less common in other studies. Adoption of the 
single currency is measured by a dummy variable that changes from zero to one when both of 
the countries are members of  the Euro zone, denoted CUi,j,t which is the country specific impact 
of the introduction of the Euro. EUi.j.t is the variable that captures EU membership by both 
parties is an indicator that takes the value one from the point the country receiving FDI from an 
EU member itself entered the EU, and is zero before then. This enables us to assess the effect 
of ongoing European integration on the FDI decision. We also look at similar dummies for 
NAFTA membership, NAFTAi,j,t which is a dummy that is one when the host and the home 
countries are both inside the NAFTA trade block. In our robustness section we also test for time 
zone differential between countries using the standard measures. TimDiffi,j, captures the time 
zone differential between countries measured in hours. In our empirical work below we also 
separate out extra effects from home and hosts both inside and outside the EU and NAFTA, but 
                                                          
6 When the Gravity model is estimated using a random effects panel data model applied to real bilateral FDI stocks the 
Wooldridge test for first order serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2002) is found to be significant at the 1% level. This implies that 
these results cannot be relied on to provide a short-run explanation of bilateral FDI as there is inertia in the stock data; that at 
least requires a lagged dependent variable to capture this. Once a lagged dependent variable is included, then the requirement 
to control for endogeneity is best met by applying GMM to a dynamic panel model. 
7 Economic freedom has been defined as ‘the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or 
consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself’. This index 
is an indicator of the quality of the economic environment. It not only captures the economic policy of the government, but 
also the legal soundness of the economy and macroeconomic stability. 
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for brevity we do not spell out these dummies here.  
There are of course missing observations in the matrix, and this can cause problems for 
estimation and for interpretation when many observations are missing. There is a significant 
debate on missing variables in trade flows models, and this is summarised in Head and Mayer 
(2014) and Baltagi et al. (2015). In our sample, some 1985 observations, or about a quarter of 
the possible observations are absent, with a quarter of these being zero. Of the rest almost half 
come from non-reporting of data. For instance, there are no disaggregated data for Belgium 
from 1995 to 2007, and none for Spain from 1995 to 2002, despite the fact that aggregate FDI 
stocks of considerable size are reported. In addition, the FDI data contain a considerable number 
of cells that are ‘not available’ due to reporting and confidentiality restrictions, as publication 
can reveal market sensitive information8. In both cases we have a  problem where missing cells 
should not bias coefficients, as there is no reason to presume they differ from filled cells. These 
two statistical problems leave us with a an unbalanced panel with around seven percent of 
observed data points being zero, and these may be different from other cells, in that absence 
may have difference causes from the scale of presence. The largest set of zero cells is for Japan, 
where there are no stocks recorded for 13 of the 30 hosts, (around half of all zero cells), but our 
results are not particularly affected by omitting Japan, as we see below9. 
 To summarise the discussion of the variables, Table (1) below displays the variables that 
are considered here and their definitions. 
Insert Table (1) here  
4. Empirical findings for models estimated by GMM 
The preferred results from the two-step system GMM estimator are presented in Table 
(2). Several model specifications are developed. First of all, we add our European Currency 
Union and European Single Market variables to a traditional Gravity model and this is presented 
in column (1), and then to that model the trade block dummy variables for home non-EU host 
EU and home EU host non-EU are added in column (2). In column (3) a NAFTA dummy is 
added to the traditional gravity model, and in (4) non –NAFTA dummies similar to those in 
column 2 for the EU are added. In columns (5) and (6) first individual EU and NAFTA dummies 
are added to test whether there is similar within block effect on FDI stocks, and then the set of 
non-EU and non-NAFTA dummies are also included. In general, the EU dummy remains 
significant whilst the NAFTA indicator is not significant, and we may regard column (1) as our 
preferred result. 
The dynamic specification seems to be well defined from the diagnostic test for the 
definition of the instruments (Hansen, 1982).10 Across all specifications in Table 2, the results 
for the tests of serial correlation are as expected. Although it is not possible to accept the null 
hypothesis that there is no first order serial correlation, higher order serial correlation does not 
                                                          
8 Reporting based restrictions on data availability depend on country specific disclosure rules, and these differ significantly. 
The UK, France and Germany are similar large countries with considerable outward FDI stocks. They do have different 
disclosure rules, and as a result of these differences France has less than one per cent of cells absent, whilst the UK Germany 
have almost ten per cent absent for this reason. 
9 There are nine other completely empty pairs, involving the small hosts, Estonia (4), Slovenia (3) Israel and New Zealand. 
Given the scale of the zero observations problem, especially when we exclude Japan, we would argue that we do not need to 
use any of the missing observation techniques discussed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Head and Mayer (2014). 
10 The J-statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, has an asymptotic χ2 distribution 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) where the number of degrees of freedom equals the number of over-identifying restrictions. If there 
are as many moment conditions as endogenous variables then the IV/GMM criterion is zero and the coefficients of the model 
are exactly identified, but the validity of the instruments is not then tested in this context.  
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appear to be a problem as it is not possible to reject the null of no second or third order serial 
correlation. Therefore, important criterion related to the moment conditions are met as further 
serial correlation in the first-differenced disturbances at an order greater than one would render 
the GMM estimator inconsistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991, and Roodman, 2009).  
 
Insert Table (2) here 
The adjustment coefficient on lagged FDI is positive and statistically significant 
suggesting significant inertia in the stock adjustment process. The significance of the lagged 
dependent variable confirms that it is essential to use an instrumental variables estimator. Given 
the sunk costs incurred by investors to set up distribution networks and services in foreign 
markets it is not surprising that there is persistence in FDI stocks. The coefficient on lagged 
FDI in column (1) is about 0.25, and hence the long run impacts of variable are amplified by 
around a third as compared to the impact coefficient. The long-run coefficients for the 
regressions in column (1) are reported next to this column (along with the Wald test of their 
significance) in Table (2).   
There are a number of regional factors that we have included in our analysis. Perhaps our 
most important finding is that the SMP has significantly increased stocks of FDI within the 
Market, given the other factors driving FDI. The EU coefficient estimate is economically and 
statistically significant suggesting that the bilateral FDI stock between member states are higher 
than other factors, such as size and proximity, would suggest. In the long run the initial impact 
of membership of the Single Market feeds through the lagged dependent variable and raises 
FDI from other members by over 40 per cent, with supply chains spreading across the market 
area. This is clearly reversible, albeit slowly, when a country leaves the Single Market.  As we 
can see from the results in column 2, we find no evidence that the EU has attracted additional 
FDI from outside its borders given the other factors driving flows. In addition it is probably the 
case  that outward FDI from the EU has not risen any more than the traditional gravity effects 
would suggest. Although  the coefficient on home EU to host non-EU is not significant at the 
5% level, there is some evidence that the EU has increased its FDI to non-EU destinations over 
this period. This may be reflecting in part flows to pre accession countries in Europe, and we 
look at this in our robustness section. Turning to the estimation of the Euro dummy effects, it 
appears that there is no additional effect for the creation of a common currency, as the Euro 
dummy variable, when both countries (host and donor) are in the Euro zone, is not significant 
in any of the specifications in Table (2). 
We have tested for equivalent effects in NAFTA in column 3 of Table (2) and it is not 
significant on its own. The nature of integration within the NAFTA region is different from that 
within the EU, and the trade agreement is not particularly aimed at increasing economic 
integration between the countries involved. However, when we add in column 4 dummies for 
home not in NAFTA, host in NAFTA and home in NAFTA and host not in NAFTA, we find 
that Multinational firms from outside NAFTA appear to have increased their investment there 
more than might be expected, and it is clear from the data that much of that will have gone to 
Mexico, and not the US and Canada.  
We can of course add our NAFTA and EU results together, and we do so in columns 5 and 
6. It is clear that the EU has had a significant and positive impact on FDI within its region, 
whilst NAFTA has not had a significant effect within its region. This would suggest that US 
FDI to Mexico, for instance, has been no more than would have been anticipated given 
proximity and size. Hence reducing the role of NAFTA, as is currently proposed, may not lead 
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to a significant return of jobs to the US from Mexico. There is weak evidence that the NAFTA 
countries have increased their FDI to countries outside the area, as we can see from column 6, 
by rather more than we would have anticipated given the proximity and size of those countries. 
These results bring out the strong differences in the impacts of the two sets of integration forces 
in North America and Europe, with Europe displaying a pattern designed to increase 
competition within the region, and not just trade between partners11.  
As for institutional variables, the economic freedom index for the home country and host 
country is positive and highly significant presenting evidence that the OECD countries with 
good institutions managed to attract more FDI. Institutional quality is important, as Buchanan 
et al. (2012) show for a wider group of countries than in our study. Even within the OECD 
stronger institutions and a system of law enforcement signals that investors’ rights will more 
likely be protected, and that home economies will undertake proper policing of outward foreign 
investors behaviour. All these factors encourage FDI. 
Additionally, it is found that proximity indicators such as distance and language dummies 
have significant negative and positive impacts respectively. More particularly, the distance 
between home and host countries has a negative and significant impact on bilateral FDI. If 
distance increases by one per cent, the bilateral stock of FDI falls by about 0.43 per cent in the 
long run. This suggests that companies are found to prefer investing in closer countries rather 
than those farther away. Our findings suggest cultural proximity, as indicated by a common 
language has a significant positive impact, raising bilateral FDI. This factor is almost entirely 
an Anglo Saxon one, with three home countries (US, UK and Canada) sharing a common 
official language with six host nations. It is enough to explain the strong presence of US 
investment in the UK. There is also a smaller Francophone grouping (France and the 
multilingual countries, Canada, Belgium and Switzerland) where FDI stocks will be impacted. 
There is clear evidence to support the notion that transaction costs are reduced as a result of 
common cultural ties or values and that this encourages bilateral FDI.  
It appears that unit labour costs are not important as they are not significant for any 
specification of the model. This finding is consistent with Devereux and Griffith (1998) who 
also found unit labour costs differentials to be a non-significant driver of the location choices 
of US multinationals in the EU. They explain this result by their data not being disaggregated 
enough a measure of productivity so not reflecting the firm’s heterogeneity within each 
industry, but these results would suggest that this finding is more general.  
The results related to the  core variables in Table (2) are also of interest with real GDP of 
the host country and home country both having a positive sign and being statistically significant 
in all specifications. In the same way, the coefficient on bilateral exports is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting they are complementary to bilateral FDI.  The real GDP 
elasticity of the host country is around 0.6 and hence is fifty percent larger than the distance 
elasticity, and it is likely to exert a stronger effect on FDI when the FDI outflow is market 
seeking in relation to a domestic (service) market. The result suggests that the income in 
investment partners and host countries strongly influence FDI stocks. We should note that the 
impact from the host country’s GDP is almost two thirds larger than that of the home country, 
suggesting that market specific effects may dominate the gravity part of the relationship. We 
have tested for equality of coefficients for home and host factors, which are GDP and economic 
freedom effects, and it is rejected in a Wald test with Chi squared (2) of 4.94 (prob. 0.0825).  
                                                          
11 It is probably the case that efficiency has been raised within European countries by the introduction of foreign producers 
that reduce the political power of host country sectional groups, and hence has allowed the Union to increase competition.    
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5. Robustness Results  
The focus of this paper has been on a number of new variables in the Gravity approach 
to FDI, and we have looked at the role of the Single Market in Europe, NAFTA and membership 
of the Currency Union in Europe. This specific European focus allows us to look again at time 
zone effects and produce new, and negative, results on them. We also investigate whether the 
UK has special advantages that might aid it after leaving the EU. In addition, we test whether 
joining the EU boosted FDI stocks in the Accession countries, and if the accession effect 
explains the EU effects we observe. The results are reported in Table 3. In Table 4 we report 
on the impacts of removing Japan from our regressions as there is no recorded Japanese inflow 
in 13 of our host countries.   
Time zone effects have been found to be important by Stein and Daude (2007) amongst 
others, and they have a plausibility related to the need for managerial control in real time. 
However, this is not necessarily the only explanation of the coefficient. We look only at OECD 
countries, and we focus on the 14 largest home countries, and hence our results cover the vast 
majority of within OECD stocks of FDI, whereas other studies may include other countries with 
smaller outward stocks, or whose investments are driven by factors not captured in a market 
based model. We have included several European Union variables in our sample, and these 
appear to be significant, whilst time zone effects are not, as we can see from column (1) and (2) 
of Table 3. The EU countries are in three adjacent time zones, rather fewer than within the USA, 
and the inclusion of a common membership dummy indicates within EU FDI stocks are much 
higher than other gravity variables would indicate. The EU indicators appear to override any 
effects from time zones.   
In Table 3, we also include tests of the special nature of the UK as an FDI platform for 
countries outside the EU. In column 3 we include a dummy for inward stocks of FDI in the UK 
from countries outside Europe. This variable is negative but not significant, suggesting strongly 
that the UK has no labour market or competitive environment advantage above the rest of the 
EU. The scale of FDI into the UK, which has been noticeable, is picked up by other factors in 
regression, especially by a common official language with the US and Canada, an advantage 
shared with Ireland. We see no more FDI in the UK than would be expected given other 
factors, and this conclusion is reinforced by the result in column 4 where we include a dummy 
that covers FDI stocks in the UK from all EU home countries as well as those outside it. There 
is no significant UK effect in this regression, strengthening our result that the UK has no special 
attraction factors except those included in our model. 
Insert Table (3) here 
Gradual improvements in communications technology and the growth of the internet may 
lead to the ‘Death of Distance’, but its demise is clearly an empirical matter. In column 5 of 
Table 3 we add a new variable to column 1 of Table 2 to test for this effect, and we find that 
the product of time and distance (Tdistance) has a significant and positive effect, indicating that 
distance is becoming a less important factor over time. However, given the coefficient on 
distance is –0.2932 whilst the decay coefficient is +0.002 it will take 150 years of linear decay 
from our start date in 1995 for the effect of distance to disappear completely. Given we are 
early in this 150 years process there is no way to find if decay will continue to zero or whether 
it will asymptote at a lower coefficient in 30 years (or at some other date). As the coefficient of 
Death of Distance is so small we do not introduce it in our other regressions as its absence will 
not induce biases in coefficients.  
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In our discussion of the results of the complete set of EU and NAFTA dummies in Table 
2 we suggest that some of the effects of the EU to non EU members may be an accession effect. 
We test this in two ways. First, in column 6, we include a dummy that is one for the three years 
before the new EU members joined in 2004 and zero otherwise (see appendix), to test if there 
was any pre-accession surge in FDI flows to these countries. Our results indicate that the EU 
accession process had a positive impact on FDI inflows to potential new EU members. It is 
clear from these results that the flows to the potential new members largely explain the 
significance of the home EU host non-EU coefficient in Table 2.  Indeed, it is possible that our 
positive EU membership effect is just a continuing effect of higher FDI to the new members 
once they have joined. In order to test this in column 7 we have added a dummy variable that 
is one in the year after new members join and zero otherwise, and our results indicate that there 
is no additional FDI increase after accession. This could indicate that the advantages of EU 
membership were taken on board before actual accession, as we found in column 6. One of the 
EU’s main aims in its accession policy is to encourage economic development and regional 
integration between the EU countries, and our FDI results suggest it has been successful. 
Our remaining tests involve repeating Table 2 after excluding Japan from the data set as 
there are so many missing stocks for the whole period. This may reflect data problems, but it 
may also be that there are other factors at work. We miss stocks for Finland, Hungary and 
Estonia, where the basic language is Finno-Hungaric, and for Slovenia, Poland, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, where the basic language is Slavic, and also for Greece and Turkey. In each 
case the language problem may, for Japanese speakers, be more severe than with English or 
with the core Latin or Germanic languages. Japan also happens to be the second largest 
economy in our sample and distant from the main European countries in our sample. Hence this 
lack of data might bias our distance coefficient upwards and our home GDP coefficient 
downward, but we find the reverse. There is evidence that the home GDP coefficient is lower 
without Japan, whilst the host coefficient is higher, and if we exclude Japan the distance 
coefficient is higher, suggesting Japan may do more FDI than its size and distance suggests. 
We have tested the equality of the coefficients in the with and without Japan panels based on 
our maintained hypothesis that the missing observations are a statistical problem not a structural 
one. A Wald test of the restriction is easily passed, with a Chi squared (15) of 4.79 (prob. 
0.9938), and we would conclude that our core results in column 6 of Table 2 are statistically 
the same as the core results in column 6 of Table 4. 
Insert Table (4) here 
6. Concluding Remarks         
Our objective has been to investigate the role of market integration in determining the 
pattern of bilateral FDI in the OECD, and we have focussed on the major home countries 
amongst the advanced market economies. We can, as a consequence of our results, draw 
conclusions both for policy makers and for potential future work on patterns of bilateral FDI in 
market economies. It is clear that the creation of a Common, or Single Market between 
countries changes patterns of FDI, It is also clear that if we do not take in to account the creation 
of the Single Market we may not properly explain FDI patterns. In addition, increases in the 
distance between partners is a major factor affecting stocks of FDI, with a ten per cent increase 
in distance apart reducing FDI stocks by over four per cent. This is marginally larger than the 
impact of home size, but less than that of host size in the long run. There is evidence that the 
effects of distance are being reduced, perhaps by new technologies, but this process is very 
slow, with the coefficient falling from above four per cent at the start of our sample to above 
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three and a half at the end of it. Distance may be dying, but it is doing so very slowly.  
It is inevitable that the country selection in this study is weighted toward Europeans 
because they form the majority of countries in an OECD sample. The nature of the European 
sample has changed over time, with at least four countries that did not exist in 1990. We also 
have a number of host countries joining the EU and a group of EU countries forming a currency 
union. Some of these changes have also stimulated FDI, with stocks from EU countries located 
in potential members rising for the three years before accession. However, membership of the 
currency union does not appear to change patterns of FDI. We have tested for time zone 
differential effects, and we have shown that when we include them along with the SMP and 
other gravity indicators they are not significant, and we would conclude that ‘facetime’ contact 
for FDI investments is not as important as in banking relationships, for instance.  
We have tested extensively for the effects of European and North American trade 
agreements and other institutional factors, and we found that common membership of the 
European Union had a significant and positive effect on bilateral FDI. If both countries are 
members of the Single Market then bilateral FDI stocks are likely to be 40 per cent higher than 
they would otherwise have been. This reflects a number of factors, but it is suggested that it 
comes mainly from the Single Market programme, the major institutional attempt to reduce 
barriers to trade and capital flows within Europe. Other institutions also matter, with our home 
and host Economic Freedom indicators raising stocks wherever better quality institutions 
existed. There is no evidence, however, that NAFTA had an impact on FDI stocks in the same 
way. Further research could look in more detail at the effects on FDI of the formation of trade 
blocks and their changing nature over time. 
Going forward, our results suggest that the UK will see a significant reduction of FDI 
stocks from other European economies, such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, if it 
leaves the EU and is outside the Single Market. The Single Market was, and should be seen as, 
an attempt to emulate the efficiencies of the US Single Market. Although there is still some 
distance to go in terms of efficiency, progress has been made, but that progress will probably 
be reversed in the UK once it leaves, with the stock of FDI from (other) EU countries falling 
by perhaps a third as supply chains adjust. There is no evidence that the UK benefits from 
having a liberalised labour market in attracting FDI, as the inclusion of size, distance, and 
perhaps importantly a common official language are sufficient to explain FDI in the UK from 
outside the Single Market.  
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Appendix- Countries included in the sample. 
Home countries 
(14) 
EU Countries  
(accession dates) 
Currency 
Union (dates) 
Host Countries 
(31) 
EU Countries  
(accession dates) 
Currency 
Union (dates) 
Austria EU 1999 Australia -- -- 
Belgium EU 1999 Austria EU  1999 
Canada  (N) -- -- Belgium EU 1999 
France EU 1999 Canada  (N) -- -- 
Germany EU 1999 Czech Republic EU 2004 -- 
Italy EU 1999 Denmark EU -- 
Japan -- -- Estonia EU 2004 2011 
Korea, Rep. -- -- Finland EU 1999 
Netherlands EU 1999 France EU 1999 
Spain EU 1999 Germany EU 1999 
Sweden EU -- Greece EU 2001 
Switzerland -- -- Hungary EU 2004 -- 
United Kingdom   EU -- Ireland EU 1999 
United States  (N) -- -- Israel -- -- 
   Italy EU 1999 
   Japan -- -- 
   Korea, Rep. -- -- 
   Mexico  (N) -- -- 
   Netherlands EU 1999 
   New Zealand -- -- 
   Norway -- -- 
   Poland EU 2004 -- 
   Portugal EU 1999 
   Slovak Republic EU 2004 2009 
   Slovenia EU 2004 2007 
   Spain EU 1999 
   Sweden EU -- 
   Switzerland -- -- 
   Turkey -- -- 
   United Kingdom   EU -- 
   United States  (N) -- -- 
Sources, OECD FDI statistics. NOTE: N: NAFTA block member. 
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Table (1) Variables definitions and data sources. 
Variables Unit Source 
, ,i j ty =Log (FDIi,j,t/  
GDP Deflatori,t) 
is the stock measure of bilateral outflow from the home 
country (i) to the host country (j) in year t, with FDI in 
current in US$ deflated using the home country’s GDP 
deflator.  
 (OECD) 
EXPi,j,t 
Bilateral exports of goods are just used (As exports of 
service data are not available for most of the countries in 
the sample). 
 (OECD) 
Real GDPi,t, 
  Real GDPj,t 
At constant 2005 prices and converted to US$s.   (OECD) 
DISi,j,t 
Measure in geographical distance in kilometres to proxy 
transportation costs 
CEPII Distance Database 
(www.cepii.fr) 
Freei,t .  Freej,t 
An index of economic freedom that refers to whether 
there is any restriction on trade in a country. 
Heritage Foundation 2015 
(www.heritage.org) 
EUi,j,t  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j are EU 
members at time t and 0 otherwise. (see Appendix) 
NAFTAi,j,t 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j are 
inside NAFTA trade block members at time t and 0 
otherwise. 
(see Appendix) 
Langi,j 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when both countries share 
a common official language www.cepii.fr 
CUi,j,t 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j use the 
same currency (euro) at time t and 0 otherwise. (see Appendix) 
ULCj,i,t 
labour costs in the host country relative to the home 
country, Exchange Rate Adjusted ULC, Index OECD 
base year (2010=100)  
 (OECD) 
TimDiffi,j,t 
Variable accounting for the time differential in between 
the capital cities of the lender and borrower countries. 
Britannica atlas, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Inc. 1994 
home- Non EU, 
host- EU 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if home country is a non-
EU member and host country is EU member at time t 
and 0 otherwise. 
(see Appendix) 
home-EU,   
host- Non EU  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if home country is EU 
member and host country is a non-EU member at time t 
and 0 otherwise. 
(see Appendix) 
home- Non NAFTA,  
host- NAFTA 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if home country is non- 
NAFTA member and host country is NAFTA member 
at time t and 0 otherwise. 
(see Appendix) 
home- NAFTA,  
host- Non NAFTA 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if home country is 
NAFTA member and host country is non- NAFTA 
member at time t and 0 otherwise. 
(see Appendix) 
home- Non EU,  
UK (host)  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if home country is a non-
EU member and the UK is host country at time t and 0 
otherwise. 
(see Appendix) 
UK (host)   Dummy variable that equals 1 when the UK is host country and 0 otherwise. (see Appendix) 
Before joining EU Dummy variable that equals 1 in the three years before the joining new EU members in 2004 and 0 otherwise. (see Appendix) 
After joining EU Dummy variable that equals 1 in the year after new members joining year and 0 otherwise. (see Appendix) 
The dependent variable, real bilateral FDI stock, is real FDI outflows from 14 High income OECD  to all the 
OECD countries. The nominal FDI outflows to the OECD  are converted to real value by dividing GDP 
deflator.  
       **Annual data over the period 1995-2015 
 17 
 
 
Table (2) Results for dynamic panel-data estimation using two-step SYS-GMM, for 
FDI stocks. 
Independent 
Variables Column (1) 
long-run 
estimates Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
ݕ୧,୨,୲ିଵ 0.2501***  0.2570*** 0.2504*** 0.2495*** 0.2509*** 0.2550***  
(0.0303)  (0.0305) (0.0308) (0.0308) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
log൫ܩܦ ୧ܲ,୲൯ 0.3009
** 0.4012 
 
0.2745** 0.2650** 0.2247** 0.2909** 0.2339**  
(0.1233) 6.01** (0.1207) (0.1200) (0.1063) (0.1212) (0.1075) 
log൫ܩܦ ୨ܲ,୲൯ 0.4764
*** 0.6352 
 
0.4915*** 0.4366*** 0.4200*** 0.4934*** 0.4795***  
(0.0796) 38.00*** (0.0809) (0.0774) (0.0749) (0.0775) (0.0765) 
log൫ܧܺ ୧ܲ,୨,୲൯ 0.3568
*** 0.4757 
 
0.3464*** 0.4042*** 0.4220*** 0.3591*** 0.3746***  
(0.0581) 40.68*** (0.0593) (0.0563) (0.0569) (0.0580) (0.0593) 
ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୧,୲ 0.0370*** 0.0493 
 
0.0427*** 0.0346*** 0.0327*** 0.0375*** 0.0400***  
(0.0057) 43.43*** (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0061) 
ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୨,୲ 0.0298*** 0.0397 
 
0.0258*** 0.0279*** 0.0313*** 0.0286*** 0.0290***  
(0.0055) 29.81*** (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0061) 
log൫ܦܫ ୧ܵ,୨,୲൯ -0.3280
*** -0.4373 
 
-0.2891*** -0.3638*** -0.4199*** -0.3386*** -0.3540***  
(0.0732) 20.41*** (0.0758) (0.0708) (0.0735) (0.0732) (0.0782) 
ܮܽ݊݃୧,୨ 1.5058*** 2.0077 
 
1.7550*** 1.5991*** 1.2513* 1.5796*** 1.4249** 
 (0.5457) 7.89*** (0.6360) (0.5473) (0.6387) (0.5497) (0.6367) 
ܥ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ -0.0212 -0.0283 
 
-0.0278 0.1024 0.1347 -0.0296 -0.0115 
 (0.0979) 0.05 (0.1029) (0.1072) (0.1038) (0.0988) (0.0988) 
log(ܷܥܮ୨,୧,୲) -0.0828 -0.1104 
 
-0.0521 -0.1523 -0.0769 -0.0911 0.0105 
 (0.1053) 0.62 (0.1079) (0.1040) (0.1072) (0.1044) (0.1151) 
ܧ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ 0.3261** 0.4348 
 
0.6036**   0.3068** 0.5895*** 
 (0.1365) 5.87** (0.2432)   (0.1363) (0.2033) 
ܰܣܨܶܣ୧,୨,୲    -1.1132 -0.8231 -0.8202 -0.3882 
    (0.8782) (0.8124) (0.8259) (0.7783) 
home- Non EU,  
host- EU   0.1242    0.0752 
   (0.1683)    (0.1622) 
home-EU, 
 host- Non EU 
 
  0.3344*    0.3538** 
  (0.2001)    (0.1727) 
home- Non NAFTA, 
 host- NAFTA     0.4471
**  0.3523* 
     (0.1948)  (0.1934) 
home- NAFTA, 
 host- Non NAFTA     0.3880  0.5025
* 
     (0.3012)  (0.3039) 
Constant -18.4768***  -18.7154*** -16.7472*** -15.2897*** -18.5708*** -17.4200***  
(2.5884)  (2.7150) (2.5050) (2.4344) (2.6174) (2.5720) 
Observation 6256  6256 6256 6256 6256 6256 
AR(1) test  -6.85***  -6.90*** -6.87*** -6.87*** -6.86*** -6.91*** 
AR(2) test  -0.22  -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.20 -0.13 
J-test2 394.06  393.82 394.09 394.97 393.24 393.63 
J-test: p-value 0.962  0.965 0.952 0947 0.960 0.965 
Notes: All regressions are estimated over the period 1995–2015 using a dynamic two-step system GMM estimator (Blundell and 
Bond,1998) with finite sample correction to the variance-covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005). Huber–White robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel coherent serial 
correlation tests (AR(p)) are for order p=1,2 (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The J-test statistic with p-values related to over-identifying 
restrictions (Hansen (1982). 
Note: the table shows the long-run estimates derived from an underlying short-run dynamic model using the two step systems GMM. A 
Wald test 2(1) is reported in the second row for each long run coefficient. Denoted by ***, **, and *, coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table (3) Robustness Results   
Independent 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) 
ݕ୧,୨,୲ିଵ 0.2510*** 0.2507*** 0.2504*** 0.2502*** 0.2226*** 0.2637*** 0.2652***  
(0.0304) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0308) 
log൫ܩܦ ୧ܲ,୲൯ 0.3009
** 0.3027** 0.2994** 0.3021** 0.3021** 0.2830** 0.4164***  
(0.1239) (0.1265) (0.1235) (0.1254) (0.1436) (0.1176) (0.1085) 
log൫ܩܦ ୨ܲ,୲൯ 0.4911
*** 0.4761*** 0.4784*** 0.4669*** 0.4849*** 0.3332*** 0.3945***  
(0.0775) (0.0794) (0.0796) (0.0825) (0.0872) (0.0678) (0.0681) 
log൫ܧܺ ୧ܲ,୨,୲൯ 0.3587
*** 0.3555*** 0.3563*** 0.3613*** 0.3376*** 0.4316*** 0.3429***  
(0.0580) (0.0580) (0.0581) (0.0583) (0.0615) (0.0594) (0.0589) 
ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୧,୲ 0.0374*** 0.0370*** 0.0370*** 0.0367*** 0.0265*** 0.0410*** 0.0427***  
(0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0066) 
ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୨,୲ 0.0292*** 0.0301*** 0.0297*** 0.0297*** 0.0173** 0.0211*** 0.0238***  
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0062) 
log൫ܦܫ ୧ܵ,୨,୲൯ -0.2820
** -0.2989** -0.3298*** -0.3245*** -0.2932*** -0.1576* -0.2763***  
(0.1285) (0.1212) (0.0733) (0.0739) (0.0836) (0.0923) (0.0794) 
ܮܽ݊݃୧,୨ 1.6494*** 1.5725** 1.5238*** 1.5458*** 2.6903*** 2.2596*** 1.9794*** 
 (0.6394) (0.6198) (0.5643) (0.5498) (0.7356) (0.7031) (0.6523) 
ܥ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ -0.0396 -0.0273 -0.0216 -0.0268 -0.1400 -0.0916 -0.0473 
 (0.1045) (0.1018) (0.0984) (0.1018) (0.1220) (0.1096) (0.1056) 
log (ܷܥܮ୨.୧,୲) -0.0888 -0.0786 -0.0835 -0.0985 -0.0174 -0.2869** -0.2926** 
 (0.1061) (0.1064) (0.1050) (0.1048) (0.1081) (0.1275) (0.1230) 
ܧ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ 0.3053** 0.3259** 0.3260** 0.3333** 0.5033*** 0.8207*** 0.6880*** 
 (0.1386) (0.1377) (0.1363) (0.1368) (0.1573) (0.2752) (0.2502) 
ܰܣܨܶܣ୧,୨,୲ -1.0075       
 (0.8242)       
TimDiffi,j,t -0.0189 -0.0104      
 (0.0312) (0.0290)      
Tdistance     0.0020***   
     (0.0008)   
home- Non EU, UK 
(host)   -0.0123     
   (0.3041)     
UK (host)      -0.0434    
    (0.2071)    
home- Non EU,  
host- EU      0.2232 0.1193 
      (0.1874) (0.1712) 
home-EU, 
 host- Non EU      0.4563
** 0.4404** 
      (0.2142) (0.2027) 
Before joining EU      0.6270***  
      (0.1746)  
After joining EU       0.0275 
       (0.1349) 
Constant -19.2006*** -18.7133*** -18.4548*** -18.3550*** -16.8606*** -17.4499*** -20.1562***  
(2.8643) (2.8119) (2.6014) (2.5904) (3.1572) (2.7152) (2.6446) 
Observation 6256 6256 6256 6256 6256 6256 6256 
AR(1) test  -6.86*** -6.86*** -6.86*** -6.86*** -6.49*** -7.07*** -6.94*** 
AR(2) test  -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.23 -0.50 -0.29 -0.17 
J-test2 393.18 393.92 393.17 393.94 392.82 393.06 393.91 
J-test: p-value 0.958 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.948 0.962 0.964 
                    Notes: See definitions at the bottom of Table 2. 
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Table (4) Results for dynamic panel-data estimation using two-step SYS-
GMM, for FDI stocks. (without Japan) 
Independent 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
ݕ୧,୨,୲ିଵ 0.2528*** 0.2598*** 0.2491*** 0.2482*** 0.2532*** 0.2572***  
(0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0310) 
log൫ܩܦ ୧ܲ,୲൯ 0.2333
* 0.1981* 0.1985 0.1811* 0.2278* 0.1515 
  (0.1250) (0.1198) (0.1241) (0.1098) (0.1234) (0.1148) 
log൫ܩܦ ୨ܲ,୲൯ 0.4981
*** 0.5170*** 0.4595*** 0.4354*** 0.5106*** 0.4872***  
(0.0825) (0.0848) (0.0805) (0.0773) (0.0803) (0.0791) 
log൫ܧܺ ୧ܲ,୨,୲൯ 0.3546
*** 0.3396*** 0.4068*** 0.4222*** 0.3584*** 0.3743***  
(0.0597) (0.0615) (0.0580) (0.0576) (0.0597) (0.0604) 
ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୧,୲ 0.0379*** 0.0458*** 0.0352*** 0.0309*** 0.0384*** 0.0423***  
(0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0060) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0063) 
ܧܿ݋ܨݎ݁݁୨,୲ 0.0298*** 0.0249*** 0.0276*** 0.0323*** 0.0289*** 0.0287***  
(0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0058) (0.0063) 
log൫ܦܫ ୧ܵ,୨,୲൯ -0.3427
*** -0.2964*** -0.3763*** -0.4573*** -0.3502*** -0.3831***  
(0.0732) (0.0750) (0.0710) (0.0769) (0.0732) (0.0768) 
ܮܽ݊݃୧,୨ 1.4225*** 1.7144*** 1.5494*** 1.1892* 1.5138*** 1.3889** 
 (0.5330) (0.6263) (0.5394) (0.6202) (0.5352) (0.6215) 
ܥ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ -0.0081 -0.0082 0.1104 0.1391 -0.0171 0.0097 
 (0.0978) (0.1030) (0.1094) (0.1025) (0.0994) (0.0985) 
log (ܷܥܮ୨,୧,୲) -0.0138 0.0116 -0.0849 -0.0274 -0.0212 0.0475 
 (0.1148) (0.1200) (0.1140) (0.1190) (0.1145) (0.1295) 
ܧ ୧ܷ,୨,୲ 0.3166** 0.6884***   0.2991** 0.7649*** 
 (0.1354) (0.2629)   (0.1358) (0.2248) 
ܰܣܨܶܣ୧,୨,୲   -1.0481 -0.7662 -0.8294 -0.1239 
   (0.8795) (0.8317) (0.8426) (0.8470) 
home- Non EU, 
host- EU  0.1570    0.0653 
  (0.1838)    (0.1710) 
home-EU, 
 host- Non EU  0.4345
**    0.5858*** 
  (0.2180)    (0.1993) 
home- Non NAFTA, 
host- NAFTA    0.4328
**  0.3158 
    (0.1928)  (0.1953) 
home- NAFTA, 
 host- Non NAFTA    0.5319
*  0.8388** 
    (0.3185)  (0.3384) 
Constant -17.1274*** -17.3668*** -15.4935*** -14.1583*** -17.3005*** -15.4917***  
(2.6422) (2.7378) (2.6103) (2.5596) (2.6672) (2.7114) 
Observation Number 5985 5985 5985 5985 5985 5985 
AR(1) test  -6.76*** -6.81*** -6.75*** -6.74*** -6.77*** -6.81*** 
AR(2) test  -0.24 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 -0.23 -0.13 
J-test2 377.85 377.12 377.66 378.34 377.87 377.83 
J-test: p-value 0.984 0.987 0.979 0.976 0.983 0.984 
Notes: See definitions at the bottom of Table 2. 
 
